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KÁPLONA, 26th-27th February 1849 This Volley & Bayonet scenario has been developed by William Haggart. Background Both commanders were planning a winter offensive, but the actual battle that developed was a surprise to both of them. The Polish patriot leading the Hungarians, General Dembiński, didn't think the Austrians were so close to their staging area along the Tarna River. The Austrian commander, Windisch-Grätz, thought the main Hunagrian forces to be much further east. After concentrating at Gödöllő, the main Imperial army arrived at the Tarna River around midday on February 26th. First there was an artillery duel, but then the Austrians launched some infantry attacks across the river, but were driven back. Then they gained some room to maneuver north of Kál and Káplona when Poeltenberg gave up Aledrő and Feldebrő, and retreated to the heights further from the river that the divisional commander felt was more defensible ground. The situation stablized when darkness fell, but the Hungarian commanders made two omissions of crucial importance: Dembiński did not send for the five second echelon divisions until nightfall, even though they were only one half to a day's march away. Klapka failed to occupy the Sirok pass north of the battlefield, even though Schlik's corps was expected from that direction. Even though the Hungarian Army held a numerical advantage over the Austrians, 35,000 Honvéds to 30,000 imperial soldiers, a third would not be present on the battlefield. It would be a grueling two-day battle. Scenario:
The Battle of KÁPLONA , February 26-27, 1849 Terrain: The table is 9' X 5', the squares one foot on a side. One inch represents 100 yards. The top of the map is east; right side is south.
Time: The battle begins at 12 p.m. and goes until 5 p.m the first day, six turns. The Austrians move first, entering the table. The second day, the 27th, the battle begins at 7 am and goes until 5 pm (ten turns), or until one army completely leaves the battlefield. Special Circumstances: 1842M Augustin Musket: Both armies had regular units armed with the 1842M Augustin-type cartridge-fuse smoothbore musket. It had an early version of the percussion-cap. This should increase the firepower of these units. The question is "how much?" No calculations of the smoothbore's effect compared to the flintlock have been found. I give them a 15% increase in their fire effects, depending on the game rules. For instance, it has been determined that as many as one in four shots of a musket misfired, so decreasing that misfire to 1 in 6 or 7 seems reasonable, but just a guess. When infantry units fire, normal or stationary, one die hits on a 5-6 . This is for formed units only--not skirmishers. Rockets: The rockets used by both sides were light, short-range weapons that were used in those situations where canister was appropriate. They were deployed on tri-pods and set up close together. They were usually fired horizontally. They had an effective range of about 400 yards. Rockets are treated as light artillery, except they only use the short range of light artillery, 4". When used against cavalry, they have a to hit of 4-6, but cavalry still have a saving throw. Brandenstein DC : This command stand opperates as DC for only two units, the 2nd & 6th Feldjagers. If those two units are eliminated, then the Brandenstein officer stand is removed. The two SPs of the Feldjagers still count for exhaustion against Csorich's division if eliminated. This force basically used for a flanking screen and scouting. Two Day Battle: The V&B rules for two day battles apply to this scenario. Schlik: This officer had an electrifying effect on his troops. Perhaps it was the black eye patch or his fierce temper. Whatever the causes, he was capable of getting more out of the Austrian soldier than other generals. To simulate this, when Schlik's stand is in contact with a division stand (Only one at a time), the division does not suffer the effects of exhaustion. When and if the division loses enough troops to bring it to collapse, then all effects of exhaustion and collapse are suffered, regardless of Schlik's presence. Rifled Armed Troops: The Austrian Jaegers and the Hungarian Ujházy Rifles are rifle-armed. They are treated like other rifle-armed troops in Napoleonic scenarios. Force Setup and Arrivals: Austrians:
Hungarians:
Victory Conditions: Tactical Victory: Either side has 1.5 more points than the other. Decisive Victory: Either side has 2 times the points. Strategic Victory: Either side has 2.5 times the points. Both sides gain points for the following: Towns: Towns with bridges over the Tarna River count as one point if controlled, except for Káplona, which counts for three points. (Control is given to the army with units that were the last to pass through them.) The Hungarians control all towns at the beginning of the scenario. Exhaustion: Each enemy division that suffers exhaustion counts as one point. Each collapsed division counts as three points. Road Control: The side that controls the road from "A" to Káplona, earns two points. The side that controls the road from Káplona to "C" earns two points. LOCs: The Austrian lines-of-communication are off the table at "A" and "B." The Hungarian LOC is off the table at "C" and "D." If there are friendly units that cannot trace a line free of enemy units or within 6" of enemy units to either of their LOC roads off the table, are counted as lost. One point for each lost unit, regardless of it's condition. In the actual battle, the Austrians won a Decisive Victory that was touted by the Austrians as a Strategic Victory. Considering the strategic situation that led to the battle, if the Hungarians win in any way, they are creating some very serious problems for the Austrians, both militarily and politically. The Austrian Military desperately needed the victory, which led to Windisch-Grätz's exaggerations. Order
of Battle Austrian
Main Army (24,195 and 111 guns) Fedlmarschcall
Fürst Windisch-Grätz (AC) II Armee Korps, FML Wrbna (CC), (11,075 infantry, 2,000 cavalry, 1,260 artillerists / 63 guns. Total: 14,085 men & 63 guns). Corps Artillery Reserve
1st
Division, FML Csorich (DC), Ex = 7
2nd Division, FML Fürst Schwarzenberg (DC), Ex = 9
Grenadier
Brigade Dietrich
Cavalry Brigade Bellegarde
Brandenstein,
DC (commands the 2nd & 6th Feldjagers)
III
Armee Korps, FML Count Franz Schlick (CC Corps Artillery Reserve
1st
Division, FML Lobkowitz (DC), Ex = 6
2nd
Division, FML Leichtenstein (DC), Ex
= 5 Brigade Fiedler
Brigade Parrot
The Austrian Main Army:
The Honvéd Upper Danubian Army (19,700 and 84 guns) Major-General
Count Henryk Dembińsky (AC) I CORPS, Major-General Georg Klapka (CC) (7,900 men & 36 guns.)
1st
Division, Colonel Desewssy (DC), Ex = 6
2nd
Division, Colonel Máriássy (DC), Ex = 6
II Corps 1st
Division, Colonel Sekulits (DC), Ex = 3
VII Corps, Major-General General Artúr Görei (8500 men & 48 guns)
1st
Division, Colonel Aulich (DC),
Ex = 8
3rd
Division, Colonel Pöltenerg (DC), Ex = 8 (4500
men)
The Honvéd Upper Danubian Army: This army had used the winter months to build. It was now actually larger than the Austrian army facing it, but it was still relatively inexperienced. It's major liabiltiy was it's commander, Count Henryk Dembińsky. While an experience soldier, he did not possess either any command ability or the respect of the Hungarian officers. Kossuth had placed a Polish ex-patriot in command because he feared that a Hungarian general like Görgei, becoming popular and cutting the fledgling republic off at the knees like some new caesar. In this scenario, the lack of reinforcements are more than enough to allow "Dembińsky to be Dembińsky." As for supplies, the Hungarians had achieved wonders in supplying and arming their armies. The Hungarian army was at least as well supplied and armed as the Austrians. These troops were also more motivated than the Austrians, as evidenced by their behavior at the end of the battle. The Battle of from Káplona: The Second Day, February 27th During the night, Dembińsky moves Poeltenberg's division towards Verpelét to reinforce Dessewffy's division leaving Feldebrő and Aldebrő exposed. In the morning, the battle begins with Schlik's Corps pushing down from the north against Dessewffy's outnumbered division in Verpelét. It is a bloody battle that is saved by the arrival of Poeltenberg's troops, his cavalry pushing back the imperial squadrons in pursuit of Desswffy's infantry. Desswffy orders a counterattack on Verpelét, which fails. Görgei Took over the two divisions, and fell back to the hills of Kerecsend (east part of the map) where the fighting resumed full-force. Schlik tried to move west towards Káplona, but his assaults collapsed in the face of the Hungarian guns. As Schlik was turning Desswffy out of Verpelét, the Austrians of the II Corps were storming the Tarna Bridge at Káplona. In spite of the Hungarian attillery, they manage to occupy the western edge of the town. Dembińsky counter-attacked several times with no success. Then he stood in front of the 2nd battalion of the Italian 16th Anini Infantry Regiment and managed to gain some ground, but even this attack ground to a halt. The Austrians in the meantime had brought more troops over the bridge and worked their way behind the battalion and decimated them with their volleys. Dembińsky was wounded and barely escaped, but the 2nd Battalion was forced to surrender. The Hungarians were thus forced out of Káplona altogether. Colonel Máriássy positioned troops east of the town, and with well organized artillery fire, was able to keep the Austrian contained in Káplona. Unfortunately for the Hungarians, Colloredo was crossing the Tarna at Tófelo. Driving away the weak Hungarina defense, they Threatened to encircle Máriássy. At 1 pm, Dembińsky ordered a retreat for Máriássy and the left flank in the south that had been holding out successfully. The orderly retreat of the left flank was soon followed by the battered retreat of Poeltenberg's and Dessewffy's divisions. The Honvéd army lost about 1,000 dead and wounded, plus about 1,200 captured, most from the 16th Zanini. (Some claimed that the Venetian 16th had 'gone over to the enemy,' and the Hungarians subseqently shot the regiment's commander. The Imperial forces suffered about 1,000 casualties. The battle was lost and the Imperial forces had won, but it was not decisive, nor had the Hungarians lost heart because of the defeat. On the 28th, the Hungarian army united in the hills near Kerecsend, three miles from the battlefield. All Austrian pursuit had been driven off. The troops called for a renewed offensive, and when Dembińsky refused, the army began to call for his removal. The dissatisfied army felt betrayed, but it was Dembińsky's irresolute and uncertain military style, his mistakes and his tendency to misjudge situations as well as his morose personality, that were seen as the problem. On March 3, the officers joined in open resistance. When the Commander and Chief refused to agree to the demand that corps commanders be part of a a war council that decided future military operations, the entire officer corps refused to obey Dembińsky any longer. Kussoth saw that the army no longer trusted the Pole and he placed General Vetter in command. Unfortunately, this made Kussoth more fearful of the army in general, and Görgei in particular, even though he was only one of several general officers critical of Dembińsky. However, the change was a good one. After the battle, Fedlmarschcall Fürst Windisch-Grätz believed he had all but crushed the rebellion, and reported to the Emperor as much. He wrote, " The rebel hordes appeared at Káplona in awesome numbers. I dispersed them and destroyed the large majority. The rest fled across the Tisza. I hope to be in Debrecen in a few days and take possession of the nest of the inssurrection." The next two months would prove him wrong. Scenario
Notes Two of the characteristics of the battles during the Hungarian war were the large areas battles were fought over and the multiple fronts. Isaszeg in April and Pered in June would both have the same situation, where army corps were decending on enemy flanks. Isaszeg is nearly a reverse of Káplona, with the Hungarians victorious. Part of this reason is that the war was from the start, very fluid. The average month of the Hungarian war saw three times the battles of most other wars of the 19th Century. The scenario is interesting because of the large number of town bases and the attacks across the river. The average player will not make the mistakes that Dembińsky did, so the Austrian player will have a more difficult time of it. The Hungarians must hurt the Austrians on the first day if they are to hold out against the superior numbers the second day. It will be difficult because the Hungarians will be trying to hold a wide front with too few troops. They have the advantage of interior lines and a wall of towns to defend. The Austrians have to spread the Hungarians out, but they themselves can't desperse too much or they will be unable to bring decisive numbers to any attack, and may allow the Hungarians to defeat portions of the Austrian divisions in detail. All-in- all, a very interesting scenario for both sides. The Map |