Destruction at Dobritz
- Germany 1984
The Battle:
In the US 8th Mechanised Division sector Soviet planners believed they had entered the breakthrough phase of operations. They therefore determined to spearhead the advance of the 39th Guard Motor Rifle Division
(GMRD) with the 15th Guards Tank Regiment (GTR). The use of a tank
heavy formation was expected to wrong foot the Americans who had grown
increasingly to expect attacks by motor rifle formations supported by
helicopters and fixed wing aircraft.
Soviet reconnaissance indicated the area was covered by two American mechanised infantry battalions. One on the Soviet left and one on the Soviet
right and centre. The terrain on the
Soviet left and centre being more dense than that on the right. Soviet reconnaissance also indicated
Dobritz was likely to be held. It was further believed that additional American armour,
of unknown strength, was in reserve further to the rear. The Soviet commander expected American fixed wing aircraft to support the defence. To counter this significant care was taken to deploy the air defence assets to cover advancing formations.
The engagement was confusing and only limited details of the battle are available. NATO sources indicate the
American brigade commander was deeply concerned by the vista before him as he sipped coffee from his forward command post in
Dobritz. He had come forward to oversea the defensive positions and now
found himself in the direct line of the Soviet attack. His throat felt dry as
he scanned the fields in front of Dobritz which were full of BTR mounted
infantry supported by T-64s. Soon, reports were arriving that this forward
battalion had no less than an entire Soviet tank regiment advancing against it. His
extreme left flank was held a single tank company of M1 Abram tanks. This
company faced the better part of 60 Soviet tanks alone!
Instead of supporting the defence with fixed wing air support the Americans were reinforced with additional divisional level artillery. While these guns had been earmarked for counter battery fire they were soon being directed by the brigade HQ on to the advancing BTRs to break up this attack. Each time the rounds from the M110's landed holes appeared in the Soviet lines. The open farmland provided little cover or relief for the Soviet infantry. However, their attack continued and soon the town of Dobritz was shared between Soviet and American forces. The Soviet tank battalion advancing on the centre right soon became bogged down. With insufficient infantry in this sector T-64s were used to overrun American mechanised infantry defending small woods with mixed results. Where the attacks were supported by indirect D-30 fire they were successful, where not, they were repulsed. On the extreme Soviet right the remaining two tank battalions of 15th GTR closed on the outnumbered Abrams company composed of some ten vehicles. These M1's of Captain "Figh'n Joe" Mason's company tracked targets before firing from their concealed positions. As the 105mm guns barked there was a brief pause of two seconds before the first of many T-64s burst into flame. Mason had selected his position well and it could not be easily outflanked. After an initial burst of fire Mason requested fire from the brigade's M109A2 artillery battalion. Soon the front of his position was covered by thick smoke that further concealed his position from the now deploying Soviet tanks. Denied of targets the Soviets milled around in front as M1s engaged targets freely using thermal imaging night sights to assist with target acquisition.
With American tanks no longer visible one Soviet battalion, that advancing on the extreme Soviet right, continued it's push forward and began it's swing to the south which would eventually place it behind the American positions. From here it would, it was hoped, be able to exploit the deep penetration. However, by this stage the American reserve tank battalion had arrived in the area of the American centre left. It deployed to firing positions and engaged the Soviet tanks at ranges of around 1500m. With the additional weight of fire it quickly became apparent that the Soviet attack would fail. In the ensuing engagement two Soviet tank battalions were destroyed. The Soviet commander was now forced to face reality. His attack had suffered heavy casualties and his centre battalions were effectively
no longer operational. While both battalion commanders reported their troops were
holding their positions, despite casualties, their ability to conduct
operations was clearly limited. After consideration
of the situation he was left with no alternative. Reluctantly he issued a
orders to disengage.
Those forces that could were to be withdrawn to reform. Conclusion: The Soviet commander had managed to apply almost overwhelming strength to the American defences by a concentrated advance on the American left flank. However, he applied insufficient motorised infantry to the attack on Dobritz and the nearby woods in the centre. This was a costly error. The American early reinforcement by the tank heavy M1 battalion further turned the tide against the attacking Soviets. Though for some time the issue was in the balance the battle finally swung to the Americans. American casualties were significantly lower than that of the Soviets. Most being concentrated in one battalion which was almost down to half strength. Soviet casualties were horrific. Two Soviet tank battalions were decimated and effectively non-operational. A third battalion, composed of a BTR battalion from 117th MRR, had suffered heavy casualties and was unable to risk further advance. Of the six Soviet battalions three were burning in the fields and farmland around the small town of Dobritz. Their destruction was complete. The actual victory points can be summarised as follows:
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