The
Bridges at Harrhof
- Germany 1984
The Battle: The West German 1st Panzer Grenadier Brigade was faced with a difficult task. It had only three battalions and a significant frontage to cover. Nearest the western edge, or rear, were three key terrain features. On the right was a hill whose spot heights dominated a valley until some 1500m east a long ridge ran in a north-easterly direction towards the enemy lines. This ridge, also containing spot heights was clearly another objective. In the centre were two built up areas. The town of Frintberg was the larger of the two, measuring as it did some 800m by 400m and was located towards the rear of the 1st Panzer Grenadier Brigade's forward position. With several roads radiated from it, the town was clearly critical. The other, nearer the Soviet lines, was smaller and less important. On the West German right flank was a major area of high ground. This position dominated two bridges over the Harrhof river. The Harrhof, which was relatively deep, was a major obstacle to movement and was crossable only at the bridges. In this sector the Harrhof flowed from the Soviet east some 2.5km west before turning south. The two bridges over the Harrhof, where the river turned south, led to the small village of Bornhoft which was south east of the bridges. Bornhoft in itself would not normally be of significant importance apart from the fact it was a well-known tourist haunt in more peaceful days. However, sitting as it did, across the roads that led to the river bridges, this otherwise minor village was critical for any advancing Soviet army to secure if they intended to capture the bridges by direct assault. After due consideration Wilhelm Jurgass, commanding 1st Panzer Brigade, determined that not all objectives could be held and decided instead to focus on the three closest to the rear of his forward battle area. His two panzer grenadier battalions, 12th and 13th Panzer Grenadier, were deployed on the left and centre respectively. The left sector included one company of Leopard II tanks drawn from the brigade’s 14th Panzer Battalion. A panzer grenadier company having been transferred from 12th Panzer Grenadier to the panzer battalion. This reorganisation had created two combined arms kampfgruppes. The centre was held by 13th Panzer Grenadier, which lacked panzers, but was reinforced by a Jaguar platoon. These vehicles were old tank Jadgpanzer tank destroyers now equipped with HOT ATGWs. This battalion deployed among the woods and fields in the centre just east of the town of Frintberg. Finally, the 14th Panzer Battalion was deployed further west as the brigade reserve. Held in a central position the battalion could be moved to any of the sectors as required. However, the above dispositions meant that three objectives were not initially garrisoned. Two were close to the Soviet lines but one was on the near right flank. However, while this high ground covered the Harrhof bridges Jurgass felt it unlikely to be the primary axis of any Soviet advance due to the nature of the terrain and the bottlenecks it created. He had already made a major mistake. 1000-1020: Just after 1000 hours elements of the 240th Motor Rifle Regiment, equipped with BTRs and drawn from the Soviet 21st Motor Rifle Division were committed to the attack. Three routes of advance were initially selected for the regiment and support units, each in battalion strength. Firstly, and advancing in the centre, was the 1/240th Motor Rifle Battalion. It was advancing directly west along the banks of the Harrhof river in what would lead to a very open area near the two bridges that spanned the Harrhof. The Soviet BTR battalion was reinforced with one company of T-64B tanks from the regiments own tank battalion as well as the regimental anti-aircraft company containing both ZSU-23-4 and Gaskin platoons. Leading the advance was the regimental BRDM-2 company. In addition a second BTR battalion, the 2/240th, was committed to a deep flank march on the Soviet left flank. This battalion had crossed the Harrhof further south and was now to advance north. This battalion however could not arrive before 1040 hrs.
1020-1040: The Soviet 1/240th BTR battalion continues to push forward in the centre. West German infantry firing Milan and HOT missiles from Jaguars located on high ground engaged advanced elements of the battalion, including BTRs and BRDM-2s which were positioned forward. This resulted in several BRDM-2s exploding some 1500m from the West German positions. However, while the advancing Soviets were now clearly visible attempts to reposition the 13th PG battalion was compromised by Soviet radio jamming. With what looked to be a major threat already developing 14th Panzer Battalion was ordered forward in a urgent move to protect the flank of the 13th Panzer Grenadier Battalion. It was to secure the high ground on the right which, as will be recalled, dominated the bridges over the Harrhof river. It was suspected, but not confirmed, that a Soviet deep flank attack may occur on the right. If so the brigade's position would be quickly turned. 1040-1100: While 14th Panzer Battalion continues it’s rapid advance forward to secure the right flank West German FOO, soon to direct the fire of the M109A1s, also moved forward from a reserve position to better support the Jaguar and infantry platoons deployed on the West German centre. With the first West German units now visible, due to the tell tale signatures of their ATGW launches, Soviet reconnaissance units halted and requested indirect fire support. Within minutes the West German Jaguars and supporting infantry come under fire. In response West German observers attempted to locate the position of the firing batteries. However, for the present at least, the location of the Soviet D-30 battalion remained unknown.
Despite further Soviet attempts at radio jamming 13th Panzer Grenadier was able, finally, to complete an order change. 1100-1120: With new orders received the Marder companies of 13th Panzer Grenadier battalion began their move from their initial deployments in the fields in the left centre to the woods on the right centre. From this position it was hoped they would provide much needed fire support for other elements of the battalion now under heavy fire. However, such redeployments take time and for the time being the Jaguars and M113 equipped panzer grenadier company would need to hold as best it could. As Soviet BTRs pushed forward Soviet artillery conducted another artillery fire mission that was, fortunately for the West Germans, ineffective. In addition the position of the Soviet regimental D-30 artillery battalion was located and a West German FH-70 artillery battalion conducted an immediate counter battery fire mission. Half the D-30 battalion was soon combat ineffective with several guns completely destroyed. The Soviet 1/240th BTR battalion mortars now also conducted support fire. Like the D-30s the fire was ineffective. The location of 120mm mortars was also detected, but with limited counter battery resources, they were not immediately engaged.
1120-1140: Finally, the 14th Panzer Battalion was able to deploy on the heights overlooking the Harrhof river. One company was tasked with opposing the enemy tank battalion, while another Leopard company was diverted to slow, and hopefully halt, the 2/240th BTR battalion advancing from the still exposed West German right flank. While some BTR platoons move forward, attempting to engage with AT-7s, Fagot ATGWs were deployed to firing positions and attached T-64s halted to provide fire support. Fortunately for 14th Panzer, the fire was ineffective. Meanwhile the West German FH-70 artillery battalion continued to conduct counter-battery fire against Soviet artillery destroying further D-30 122mm towed guns. Simultaneously the M109A1s expand the smoke screen. Being fully developed it prevented the T-64s of 1/240th from supporting the BTRs of the battalion. However, now the battlefield filled with the deadly throb of Soviet helicopters as Hind helicopters moved forward. Their area of operation was to the hill that dominated the Harrhof bridges and was held, at least for now, by the 14th Panzer. The Soviet pilots no doubt were pleased with the target rich environment ahead of them. However, as the gunships engaged the Leopards they were to be disappointed. The enhanced armour of the Leopard II tanks, while not impervious to the missiles, gave them at least a degree of protection. In fact the first Leopards to be brewed up were as a result of conventional fire, by T-64s using their 125mm guns.
In the centre the Marder equipped infantry of the 13th Panzer Grenadier Battalion now engaged the BTRs of the 1/240th, which as described above, are now isolated in front of smoke screen. The fire laid down by the West Germans was both significant and effective. An entire BTR company was now suppressed in some 20 minutes of intense fire. 1140-1200: With insufficient smoke rounds to continue to stoke the smoke screen in front of the Soviet T-64s West German observers attempted to lay a new screen using the FH-70s from divisional support. However, a breeze came up and the intended smoke screen dispersed as quickly as as the shells landed. Fortunately the resulting fire from the T-64s was not effective as expected due to the panzer grenadiers gaining additional protection from the woods. Soviet losses however in the centre continued to mount. The fire of the Panzer Grenadiers was beginning to tell on the Soviets with mortars, 20mm cannons and Milan all adding to the fire put down by the grenadiers themselves. Not all was going well for the West Germans. On their right flank a platoon of Gepard self-propelled anti-aircraft vehicles moved forward to engage Hind gunships. The Gepards, armed with twin 35mm guns, could through up a thick curtain of fire and were a significant threat to the Hinds. However, the Hinds first avoided the fire and then targeted the Gepards destroying most of the platoon and thus eliminating the anti-aircraft screen for the Leopards. Simultaneously, a company of BTRs from 2/240th battalion closed on one platoon of Leopard IIs now deployed on crest of the high ground. At the same time T-64s, supporting the battalion, moved to flank the Leopards. With limited supporting infantry the Leopards were forced to engage the rapidly advancing BTR equipped mechanised infantry. While the attacking Soviet infantry suffered heavy casualties the Soviet ploy was sufficient to allow the T-64s to attack the flank of the Leopard platoon. Following this attack the West German panzer battalion was now down to one operational panzer company and one infantry company. The initiative had clearly been lost to the Soviets on the right flank. 1200-1220: With the failure to provide a smoke screen the FH-70 battalion now switched back to counter battery fire, but this time against the previously located 120mm Soviet mortars supporting the 1/240th BTR battalion. Half of the mortar company was destroyed as the 155mm shells rained in on the mortar positions. The lack of self-propelled indirect fire weapons was now clearly a disadvantage to the Soviets. While casualties in this battalion were now heavy the battalion continued to fight, though it’s ability was clearly reduced. On the West German right flank the Soviets continued to press their advantage. As their flanking move continues, supported by fire from helicopters and the supporting T-64 tank battalion the 14th Panzer Battalion finally broke. It had been an impossible task. 1220-1240: It will be recalled that the 12th Panzer Grenadier Battalion was deployed on the West German left flank. By 1120 hours it was moving in a sweeping arc which would, if all went to plan, see it attack the right flank of the Soviet 1/240th BTR battalion. The advance would also allow it secure the north-east running ridge in the left forward sector. As it approached the Soviet flank, but before it was to engage, the Soviet 1/240th BTR battalion finally broke.
The West German centre was itself under renewed threat as the Hind gunships now repositioned to engage the Jaguars and M113s on the small hill. Their position had been, for so long, critical for the defence. Without anti-aircraft support the Jaguars and a number of M113s were quickly destroyed. Then, as the smoke from several burning Jaguars drifted across the battlefield, the Soviet helicopters were forced to break-off for refuelling and rearming. 1240-1300: Finally a reserve BTR battalion, the 3/240th, was released from Soviet reserve and advanced on the Soviet right flank. It would seem that the battalion had been kept in reserve to protect against the expected West German flanking move. It now moved rapidly forward. However, with forces clearly exhausted by the battle it’s objective was limited. Rather than engage in another attack it was to contest one of the objectives, the north-east running ridge on the Russian right flank. On the Soviet left flank the 1/36th T-64 Tank Battalion was now ordered to pull back from the banks of the Harrhof river. The Soviet objective now clearly to conserve their remaining combat strength and consolidate the positions already secured. However, the redeployment was not carried out with sufficient speed. Rather, it resulted in further casualties which reduced the effective strength of the battalion to 50% of it’s original. At this stage the forces were disengaged and positions consolidated. A peace, of sorts, engulfed the battlefield. Conclusion: The Soviet commander had managed to apply almost overwhelming strength via routes of advance that the West German commander had considered unlikely. While West German forces had used their flexible doctrine they were clearly caught wrong footed. This was illustrated by the destruction of the Leopard II battalion in a well coordinated Soviet combined arms attack. However, the West German casualties were generally lower allowing them to salvage a minor victory out of what looked like certain defeat at several times during the engagement. Infact, if a break-off had been issued on the final turn of the battle the 1/36th T-64 equipped Tank Battalion would not have suffered further casualties yet still secured the village of Bornhoft on the Soviet left flank. This would have resulted in a minor Soviet victory and a reverse of the actual outcome.The actual victory points can be summarised as follows:
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