The Modern Spearhead rules have five basic troop classifications with which to rate the various nationalities and individual wars that make up the wars of the Arab-Israeli conflict. With just five classifications there still arises some interesting discussions, as different people tend to apply different ratings to the armies based on their reading and interpretations. Below are my thoughts on Modern Spearhead ratings for the Arab-Israeli Wars. I trust they are of interest and of use when refighting the Arab-Israeli wars in miniature.

Background

The Arab-Israeli Wars began with generally disorganized and “green” troops, but over time the armies of the various countries increased in professionalism, training and morale. Additionally upgraded communications became available. These factors, when applied to the events pertaining to the individual war affect the actual ratings. By careful selection of ratings it is possible to not only define many of the differences between the combatant, but also the flavour of each of the wars.

I believe that the classic mistake is overrating the Israeli formations and allowing them over flexible command structures – in MSH terms NATO1. Israeli forces made mistakes, and suffered for these mistakes. The ratings should in my opinion replicate the operational issues of the wars, and not just the theoretical abilities of the combatants. So how flexible were the Israeli forces during 1967 and 1973? How inflexible were their Arab opponents? How much was Israeli success achieved in these wars by leadership from the top and how much by the low level tactics of the individuals?

Israeli Centurion on the Golan - 8th October 1973

The Six Day War

By 1967 Israeli formations at the battalion and brigade level had become generally professional and flexible. This can be seen in their engagements in Gaza, Sinai and the West Bank. Israel of course launched the first attacks and as such her command structures were in peak readiness. Unlike operations in ’56 officers generally followed orders though they were encouraged, to use their own initiative. This initiative was displayed particularly at battalion level. Combined with command of the air and sound tactics along with well balanced force compositions the Israeli formations showed great flexibility.

In MSH terms I would rate therefore rate Israeli forces as NATO 2. In addition the normal Israeli order change under fire ability would apply. From a morale perspective individual units would contain a good proportion of “Regular” troops. Israeli forces may conduct "Radio Jamming" electronic warfare missions.

The Egyptians meanwhile while solid in defence, lacked tactical flexibility and paid for this. Formations were ordered to counter attack late or in the wrong place and defences were over-run. Worse still were the Syrians. Lacking basic formations above Brigade level they fell apart when attacked and failed to halt the Israeli advances in the Golan.

I would suggest both Egyptians and Syrians be rated as Third World, but Egyptian Infantry be rated as Regular. Egyptian armour and all Syrian troops are be best rated as Green.

Jordanian ratings are more difficult to model. The Jordanian army out performed it’s Arab allies, but was none the less hamstrung by it’s command structures. Individual battalions and brigades fought almost independent actions. While Jordanian equipment was often better than the Israeli forces opposing it the results were simply not achieved. I would suggest that Jordanian forces  be rated as WARPAC2.

Yom Kipper

Between 1967 and 1973 both Egypt and Syria under went major reorganizations and training. Both armies would enter the Yom Kipper War in considerably better shape. The Syrian army in particular was transformed. There is no doubt however that both armies remained tactically inflexible when compared with the Israeli troops.

Some hold to the view that Syrian troops performed better than Egypt in the ’73 war. While they certainly achieved initial success I believe this was more to do with wait of numbers in confined spaces rather than greater tactical flexibility. Indeed the organization of Syrian brigades into divisions was achieved just prior to the war. Indicating to me difficulties at higher levels of command. This was in contrast to the Egyptians who had been organized in higher-level formations for many years. To some extent the Syrians seem to have remained more flexible and aggressive after Israeli forces pushed them into Syria than the Egyptians countering the Israeli crossing of the Suez. However, I tend to believe these differences were more about Army level troop commitment and the effects of breakthrough manoeuvres.

I would therefore rate both Egyptian and Syrian forces as WARPAC 2 during ’73. Both may conduct "Radio Jamming" and "Radio Location" electronic warfare missions.

Of course in ’73 other Arab nations committed forces to battle. Iraqi formations performed poorly. Their attacks by green troops were ill prepared and failed quickly against the Israeli defenders. Iraqi forces are best rated as “Third World”.

Fighting alongside the Iraqi’s was the Jordanian 40th Armoured Brigade. It is interesting to note that the 40th was an elite formation, which achieved outstanding results during 1970 fighting the Syrian invasion of northern Jordan. However, in 1973 the 40th struggled to achieve success but was unsuccessful. This was as much as part of the command structure it was operating under. In particular the 40th failed to coordinate attacks with Iraqi and Syrian units, including artillery fire support. So much of this failure in 1973 must be put down to either an increase in Syrian effectiveness or lack of coordination in 1973 or the Arab forces operation on the Southern Syrian flank. From a command and control point of view, a rating of WARPAC2 is required, with morale being “Regular”.  

Iraqi and Jordanian forces may not conduct any electronic warfare missions.

The Israeli’s also trained and altered their army structure between the wars. New equipment was introduced and lessons learned from the ’67 war, though sometimes incorrectly, was applied.

But while the equipment and command abilities increased when war broke out the Israeli formations were fighting for their lives. Under the pressures of the Arab attacks command centres broke down and many were overrun especially in the Golan. On both fronts they became targets for Arab artillery fire further reducing command effectiveness. Units were “created” from available forces and thrown into combat. Supply systems broke down and tactical lessons applied since the ’67 war was found especially at the start to be flawed. Israeli success (and failure) seemed to be more related to:

• Israeli individual and small unit flexibility: Within the constraints of the MSH rule system this is perhaps best modelled by the Israeli ability to change orders more easily under fire. In addition special task forces, of weak battalions can be formed. This allows units to cover more ground, especially important if modelling the fighting in the Golan. And finally careful application of morale ratings to selected formations. 

• Lack of flexibility in attack plans of the Egyptians and Syrians: While the Syrians came close to success in the Golan it was the constant almost overwhelming pressure that they applied to defences that caused the Israelis to almost break. Likewise in the Sinai the initial well rehearsed and planned Egyptian attacks were later replaced by set piece attacks on well prepared Israeli formations. And once the Israeli forces started to counter attack the battles that followed were not that dissimilar to the battles in Gaza and the West Bank during ’67. Breakthroughs were achieved, but sometimes more by the determination of the local troops than the commanders at divisional level, who often had little or no idea what was going on in their sectors.

• Careful use of what little local support weapons that could be called on: This is best modelled in two ways. Firstly by significantly limiting air and artillery support elements available to the Israelis. Secondly that when artillery or air support is requested the request is not successful, usually due to the support being required elsewhere.

I believe all of the above can be achieved by the rating of Israeli forces as NATO2, with the Israeli ability to change orders more easily under fire. Formations on flank marches will probably arrive, but then it's not guaranteed. Israeli aircraft and artillery support will be less than ideal and often fail to arrive when required. Higher-level command and control of the battlefield will breakdown, but the troops, even when under fire will often recover a desperate situation. Equipment and training at company level is what will pull things through, as long as the basic planning is sound.

Israeli forces may conduct "Radio Jamming" and "Radio Location" electronic warfare missions.

Post 1973

Following the 1973 War Israel once again reviewed it’s performance. No longer able to rest on it’s stunning victories of 1967 equipment and tactics changed. Night fighting and electronic warfare equipment was introduced. Artillery support and including counter battery tactics reached new levels as did air and land co-operation.   By 1978 Israeli formations began to operate at considerably greater levels of flexibility. This was confirmed during the invasion of Lebanon in 1978 and again in 1982.

Syrian T-62 destroyed in fighting during 1982

Specifically in 1982 despite the operational plans changing frequently Israeli formations showed increased levels of success over a now well-equipped and combat hardened Syrian enemy and Irregular PLO formations.

I would therefore suggest that by 1982 Israeli formations be rated as NATO1. The Syrians are harder to rate, but I would suggest some formations be rated as WARPAC1, while most remain WARPAC2. Irregular formations such as the militias and PLO would of course be rated as “Third World”. Syrian and Israeli forces may conduct full electronic warfare operations.

In Summary

I trust the above ramblings are of use when you attempt to recreate the classic battles that make up the Arab-Israeli Wars. Whether you intend to refight the classic defence of Abu-Agelia, the assualts of the Syrians on the outnumbered Israeli forces in the Golan or the desperate battles in the Sinai during 1973 hopefully the above ratings will bring your MSH battles closer to the actual battles fought.

[Return to the Modern Spearhead Page] This article is compiled by Keith McNelly.