giovanni.tiso (at)
paradise.net.nz
The
spectacle of surveillance
Images
of the Panopticon in science-fiction cinema
Our society is not of spectacle, but of surveillance [...]. We are neither in the amphitheatre, nor on the stage, but in the panoptic machine, invested by its effects of power, which we bring to ourselves since we are part of that mechanism.
(Michel Focault, Discipline and Punish)
It’s not paranoia
when they’re really after you.
(Tag line of the film
Enemy of the State)
Introduction - Enemy of the State and the technology of surveillance
‘The more
technology you use, the easier it is for them to keep tabs on you’. This is how
Gene Hackman’s character in Enemy of the
State (USA, 1998, Tony Scott) a communications expert turned private
investigator by the name of Brill, explains modern surveillance at work. The
line of argument is simple: every time we use a phone, log onto a computer or
make a purchase with a credit card, we send bits of information concerning
ourselves into a world of many networks; and then all it takes is someone with
enough resources and the appropriate agenda to collect this information and
turn it into an instrument of control. Which is precisely what the American
National Security Agency is seen doing in this film, lurking in the shadow of
political protection and acting not as a line of defence against potential
threats to the State but as a very high-tech secret police.
The direct
relationship between technology and surveillance suggested by Brill has
interesting implications. For one thing, it is becoming increasingly difficult
to accept the one without the other: as socio-economic pressures drive more and
more people to increase the levels of technology in their lives, if only to
keep their jobs, there is a corresponding increase in the overall levels of
surveillance. This mutual relationship does not even require an explicit intent
to monitor people on the part of the manufacturing industry, for the devices
which make the new brand of surveillance possible - such as cellphones, credit
cards and networked computers - do not serve the primary function of keeping
tabs on people; on the contrary, they are consumer products bought on a
voluntary basis as tools to carry out certain tasks. And yet an important part
of the way they function is by leaving subtle but permanent marks which can
ultimately be traced back to their users. In time, these traces grow and start
circulating between computer systems, giving to unknown others the power to map
our lives.
A scene
from Enemy of the State illustrates
the kind of inferences which can be drawn out of such information: having
obtained two names, those of lawyer Robert Clayton Dean and freelance
entrepreneur Rachel Banks, the analysts at NSA feed them into a computer
programmed to cross-reference all the data included in the various commercial
and institutional databases in the country; in this way they are able to
ascertain more or less instantly that the pair went to college together, shared
a one bedroom flat and its bills for a few months (a connection that suggests a
romantic involvement), and that although currently living apart they have some
kind of business relationship – as can be deducted from a coincidence of
withdrawals and deposits into and from their respective bank accounts.
Older, less
technological ways of collecting data about the individual, namely those of
centralised bureaucracies, would not have been able to produce such updated and
relevant data. The registration of births, deaths and marriages (to establish
identity) and the assessment of income (for tax purposes) have been the main
instruments of control of the State over its citizens for the last few
centuries; but in comparison to the kind of information circulating in modern
databases, they tell little about the individual. Just as importantly, modern
communication systems make it much easier to cross-reference whatever
information is at hand, enabling the watchmen to establish connections without
which, as in the example above, the data themselves would be largely worthless.
The
panorama of modern surveillance would not be complete without the oldest means
of all, the one investing the very etymology of the term (literally to ‘watch
over’). Accordingly, the instruments employed by the NSA in Enemy of the State could not but include
the latest in the field of optical surveillance. All manners of cameras,
including futuristic ones mounted on satellites and keeping constant watch over
the American territory in astonishing detail, help to ensure this primary form
of surveillance by striving to keep a literal eye on the subject at all times,
while the accompanying soundtrack is provided by small and unobtrusive
microphones which can be easily concealed on and around the target.
The
powerful mix of informational, bureaucratic and optical/aural surveillance
portrayed in this film is not that far-fetched: the technology is there and the
intent has been demonstrated in several quarters[1],
leading the media to show a great deal of interest in the issues involved. The
explosion of the theme of surveillance in contemporary films - and particularly
in the science fiction genre that Enemy
of the State borders upon - should not come therefore as a surprise. Of
more interest is the technophobic bias shown by many of these films which, as
in the case of the one touched upon in this introduction, seem solely concerned
with amplifying the feelings of fear and disquiet which surround this issue
rather than with exploring the ways in which it reflects on social structures
or indeed cinema’s own involvement - as a technology-intensive industry - in
the surveillance process.
Foucault, Orwell and the one-way gaze
The
Panopticon has become the key metaphor for the power of surveillance in
contemporary society. Originally conceived by English philosopher Jeremy
Bentham in the 18th century, the Panopticon is a prison structured as a
circular building divided into cells which are all simultaneously visible from
a central tower. The inspector who inhabits the tower is rendered invisible to
the cells by Venetian blinds and by a complex system of architectural tricks,
so that the prisoners have no way of knowing whether or not they are being
watched at any given moment. In this way, although the inspector cannot
possibly look everywhere at the same time, the illusion of incessant
observation is created by removing the source of the gaze from view. Without
the need of coercion, postulated Bentham, the prisoners would follow the rules
of the prisons for the simple fear of being caught in the act of breaking them;
and in time their behaviour would become automatic, as if they had voluntarily
grown to abide by those rules. The Panopticon, in other words, was at the same
time an instrument of containment and of moral reformation. For this reason,
although his primary example was the penitentiary house, Bentham saw
applications of the design to schools, hospitals, asylums, factories; in other
words, to every situation in which a large number of individuals had to be
controlled and indoctrinated at the same time.
Despite the
fact that no such building was ever actually built, the Panopticon survived as
an organisational principle with a powerful imaginary appeal, and was taken up
by Michel Foucault as the model for the development of contemporary
disciplinary societies. In the disciplinary society, argues Foucault, power is
no longer exercised through coercion but through surveillance, by virtue of the
panoptic principle:
Hence the major effect of the
Panopticon: to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent
visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power. So to arrange
things that the surveillance is permanent in its effects, even if it is
discontinuous in its action; that the perfection of power should tend to render
its actual exercise unnecessary; that this architectural apparatus should be a
machine for creating and sustaining a power relation independent of the person
who exercises it; in short, that the inmates should be caught up in a power
situation of which they are themselves the bearers. [2]
It is
society as a whole which induces the illusion of “conscious and permanent
visibility” in its members, while power is disindividualised and rendered
automatic. The most well-known representation of this mechanism is undoubtedly
that of George Orwell’s Nineteen
Eighty-Four, in which the figure of Big Brother could be seen as the
equivalent of the inspector in the central tower of the Panopticon: he cannot
be seen, and may not even exist for all the prisoners/citizens know; all that
counts is the possibility that he may be watching, a possibility which becomes
certainty - by virtue of a paranoid short-circuit - precisely because he cannot
be seen[3].
His power is that of a social self-regulating principle which works through a
gaze which is at once literal and metaphorical.
In Michael
Radford’s Nineteen Eighty-Four (UK,
1984), the gaze of Big Brother is channelled through ubiquitous television
screens which depict the still image of his imposing face and unblinking eyes.
In this respect the film is at a distinct advantage compared to its literary
source, for it can show this haunting image, give shape and colour to it
without the need to resort to a verbal description. At the same time, the film
presents a significant structural ambiguity in terms of point of view: while
Orwell’s narrator could modulate with words his relationship with Winston and
Julia, the two main characters/victims in the story, Radford’s camera can do
little more than choose from which position to shoot them; and no matter how
sympathetic the angle, the cold fact remains that the characters are being
constantly framed, looked at, exposed in a way that presents many similarities
with the structure of the Panopticon: a single gaze, that of the spectator
through the camera, is able to watch many characters while remaining unseen.
This
unavoidable, structural effect is heightened in Nineteen Eighty-Four by an almost clinical mise-en-scene which
portrays Winston and Julia with very little sympathy; the depiction of nudity
in the sex scenes, for instance, is unromanticised and focuses on the flaws of
their malnourished bodies, so that it becomes difficult to regard them as
objects of desire. No matter how significant a point is being made in this
respect (sex is being rediscovered by people who have suffered from systematic
emotional desensitising) it is difficult to chase away the sensation that the
viewer is being asked to partake in the same kind of surveillance carried out
by Big Brother, a practice which is especially careful to leave no room for
intimacy. In fact, until the couple is captured and it transpires that their
meetings had been monitored all along, the spectators may well regard their own
powers of observation as being greater than those of Big Brother himself. But
the blind spot was an illusion, and it later becomes clear than the same
clandestine scenes observed by the audience had been - coldly and clinically,
no doubt - surveyed by the authorities.
Does this
suggest that the spectators are made to feel like accomplices of the rulers of
Oceania? My contention is that to a certain degree this is so, and that it
could not be otherwise due to the nature of the medium. The cameras and
microphones which provide a film with its narrative perspective are also
instruments of monitoring and surveillance, and every cinematic work could be
said in this respect to contain a voyeuristic dimension. Whenever this
structural aspect intersects a thematic aspect of the story, as in Nineteen Eighty-Four, this inherent
ambiguity in the position of the viewer is amplified and demands to be reckoned
with. Radford’s way of dealing with this aspect of filmmaking is to make
conscious use of it in order to heighten the isolation of the characters within
their society; hence Winston and Julia’s dream to be able to lead a secret life
in a secret place could be said to be doomed, even before the police breaks
into their upstairs room, by the fact that we
can still see them. There is secret police, sitting in theatres or in front of
television screens, that these two individuals will not be able to get away
from, so long as their story is being told cinematically.
Limits of the Panopticon
The
relationship between cinema and surveillance comes to the fore in Francis Ford
Coppola’s The Conversation (USA,
1972). The title refers to a brief conversation between a man and a woman
recorded in the midst of a crowded square by Harry Caul, a private investigator
specialised in video and audio surveillance hired for this particular
assignment by the woman’s husband. During the many sequences devoted to the
rehashing of these few lines of dialogue, the film proper turns into the one
shot by the investigator, and its images and soundtrack wholly occupy the
narrative space. That this effect can be reached with little effort - merely by using a different film stock,
distorting the soundtrack and making the appropriate deviations from the
conventions of classical mise-en-scene - makes again the point of the
contiguity between filmmaking and surveillance. What is more interesting in
this film, however, is the way that this contiguity is used to reflect on the
issues of representation and point of view, as well as to highlight certain
contradictions of the panoptic society.
As he
spends long sessions in front of his editing equipment, trying to produce the
best possible footage to hand to his client, Caul gradually develops an
obsessive interest in the content of the film he has surreptitiously shot. Of
the man and the woman in the film he knows nothing, except what he can glimpse
from the fragments of their conversation: from these he deduces that that they
are lovers, and that they are afraid that the woman’s husband may be on to
them; their wandering around in the crowded square is in fact a deliberate
attempt to escape surveillance, and it transpires that was only thanks to his
extraordinary expertise that Caul was able to overcome the technical
difficulties involved in recording their dialogue. Yet somehow this crowning
professional achievement is also the job which irrevocably undermines Caul’s
ability to distance himself from his work. The man and the woman seem afraid
that something terrible will happen, and there is no ignoring the fact that the
by passing the film on Caul will be instrumental in precipitating the events;
this realisation causes a shift in his interest from the act of surveillance
seen in complete isolation (as the art of finding solutions to a series of
technical problems), to its actual consequences. Caul’s obsession brings him to
follow the two lovers until finally, in a hotel room where he thinks a trap has
been set for them, they actually carry out the premeditated murder of the
woman’s husband.
As the
victims turn out to be murderers, Caul suffers ultimate defeat: no longer can
he hope to claim professional detachment, to be as guiltless and impartial as
one of his cameras; nor can he confide in the direct correspondence between his
recordings and the real. At the same time, the role of his film in the story
remains ambiguous: it gives the husband proof of the adultery, and perhaps
causes him to draw the same erroneous conclusions reached by Caul - that the
two lovers are afraid for their safety, when they are in fact planning a
murder. Ultimately, this false knowledge may or may not have accelerated the
death of Caul’s client. In any case, however, the scenario undermines the
notion of impartial observation: the act of watching is fraught with
consequences both for the subject and for the object of the observation; and
that these consequences are difficult if not impossible to predict, as in this
story, helps to uncover the underlying contradictions of a model of society
based on surveillance.
The
prisoners of the Panopticon may be under the illusion that they are constantly
being watched, but we know that this is not the case: there is only one
inspector in the central tower, only one gaze to be aimed to a given cell at
any one time. From the point of view of the central authority, surveillance is
therefore partial, and the data it produces will be necessarily as fragmentary
as the conversation recorded by Caul. The illusion that from these fragments it
is possible to reconstruct a true and comprehensive picture is a fallacy, for
vital pieces of information may well have fallen into one the many gaps in the
device. This consideration harks back to Foucault’s observation that
surveillance in the Panopticon is “permanent in its effects, even if it is
discontinuous in its action”. In other words, the success of the Panopticon is
based on an error of perception: if the prisoners realised that surveillance is
far from constant, and that the information it manages to gather is far from
comprehensive, the prison around them would collapse.
Section 4 - Informational surveillance and the
Superpanopticon
The flaws
as well as the oppressive might of the model of society imagined by Bentham and
Orwell are the subject of Terry Gilliam’s Brazil
(UK, 1985). This film plays down the aspects of direct, visual/aural
surveillance in favour of the informational/bureaucratic means, and yet
represents a dystopia which has still many points in common with the world
described by George Orwell: both are based on the depiction of a strong, centralised
State which claims control over every aspects of social life and has expanded
in such a way that there is no “other place” for the citizens to aspire to flee
to; here too there is a strong emphasis on propaganda and on the invention of
unseen, powerful enemies in order to justify a permanent state of national
emergency; and, crucially, the same efforts are made by the authorities to keep
the citizens under constant, obsessive monitoring. This is achieved no longer
through the gaze of a Big Brother-like figure, but through an endless
circulation of paperwork documenting every aspect of an individual’s life.
Hence the most prominent branch of the Government becomes the seemingly
all-powerful Ministry of Information.
As in The Conversation, however, here too
surveillance is very much an imperfect art. This point is made at the outset in
the form of a rather tragic joke: a cockroach falling into a typewriter
mechanism causes the name Tuttle to be changed into Buttle in a document being
issued to the Police, and this results in the arrest and eventual death under
torture of the wrong man. The point being that where absolute faith is placed
in the direct relationship between documented reality and the real, such
mistakes are inconceivable and cannot therefore be remedied; and indeed all
that the attempts by the protagonist to correct the blunder achieve is to set
off another series of bureaucratic misunderstandings, eventually resulting in
his own capture and torture by the secret police.
On this
backdrop, the film follows a different cinematic approach to the representation
of the Panopticon. Free from the burden of having to share its point of view
with that of the instruments of surveillance - for the gaze of the prison guard
here takes the form of a flow of documents - Gilliam enjoys a somewhat greater
narrative freedom, and employs it to represent the inner workings of
informational surveillance in a highly imaginative and often surreal setting.
The Ministry of Information is represented as a monster which is at once
frightening and grotesquely ridiculous, an oversized and hopelessly inefficient
system of power whose mistakes, as in the case of poor Buttle, can have deadly
consequences. It is interesting to note that the people responsible for running
this system are animated by the same constant state of paranoia that the
Panopticon strives to produce in its victims. They work on the assumption that
there is no such thing as a coincidence, and that every minute link in the
information they possess must necessarily point to a plot, a hidden design of
some kind. As one of the chief bureaucrats at the Ministry puts it, “our job is
to trace the connections and reveal them”. Hence the obsessive craving for
information by the authorities in Brazil is
motivated by their need to continuously find (or manufacture) such connections,
in order to justify their role as protectors of society.[4]
Which
brings us back to the role of the National Security Agency in Enemy of the State. The present day
capabilities of communications technology are such that the visible structure
of the Panopticon disappears altogether, for the information can be gathered
and processed incessantly without the individuals involved being any more than
vaguely aware of it. Thus the NSA does not need to rely on a totalitarian
regime around it in order to carry out its function of secret police, and
becomes a far more subtle, advanced and efficient equivalent of the oppressive
structures of power Nineteen Eighty-Four and
Brazil. At the same time, the fact
that a limited, almost subliminal level of awareness of the workings of the
Panopticon still exists, guarantees that the mechanism of self-surveillance
described by Foucault remains in place.
The mix of
informational, bureaucratic and optical surveillance portrayed in Enemy of the State is perhaps the most
straightforward cinematic attempt to date of representing what Mark Poster
calls the Superpanopticon, “a system of surveillance without walls, windows,
towers or guards”[5]. According
to this model, Bentham’s complex architectural design is replaced by the
incessant flow of information which characterises the most technologically
advanced societies; in other words, it becomes a truly automated mechanism from
which the individual cannot escape except by withdrawing from society
altogether. As more and more people become aware of being caught in this flow
of information and realise that they have no control over the circulation of
their personal data around the network, the Superpanopticon is growing into a
sort of collective nightmare which the cinema is not alone in trying to
articulate. The remainder of this paper
will be devoted to the close analysis of two recent science fiction films which
explore these issues.
The Truman Show and surveillance as a spectacle
If Enemy of the State proves that the
Panopticon can be made into a spectacle, The
Truman Show (USA, 1998, Peter Weir) goes a step further by turning
surveillance into its key narrative device.
The
foundation of the film is another truly paranoid vision: the world inhabited by
Truman Burbank is a simulation, nothing but an oversized television set, and
everyone he has ever known are actors and extras acting from a script. From the
moment he was born, Truman has been the unknowing protagonist of a show on air
twenty-four hours a day for almost thirty years. His whole life is nothing but
a spectacle made possible by a sophisticated form of surveillance akin to what
Manuel De Landa calls “the panspectrum”. The chief characteristic of the panspectrum
is the deployment of a multiplicity of sensors around several bodies instead of
several bodies around a central sensor[6].
This is how Bentham’s vision is achieved in the world outside the prison, by
multiplying the perspectives of the guards in order to cover a much greater
ground - ideally as vast as the world itself. Truman’s Seahaven Island is the
perfect panspectrum for it is filled by hidden cameras and microphones down to
its remotest corner, and nothing can escape the gaze of its all-seeing masters.
The
instruments of surveillance provide the show with its narrative apparatus, for
the same sensors that enable the television producers to track Truman’s
position on the island are also the ones which capture the video and audio
signals to be broadcast (with the addition of a few transition effects and some
music) to the television audience. What is more interesting, however, is that
during the first hour of The Truman Show
these instruments are also the narrative devices of the film itself: outside of
occasional cuts to various audiences watching the show at home or in public
places, the scenes from the end of the opening credits to the first appearance
of Christof in the film proper are seen and heard through the same cameras and
microphones which make a prisoner of Truman. We are constantly reminded of this
by the fact that most shots are framed in round or elliptic shapes which
reflect the hiding places of the various cameras, by the range of different
lenses employed and by the unusual angles which suggest that the mise-en-scene
is not totally free but constrained by the necessity to maintain secrecy (good
examples of this are the camera placed behind the transparent front panel of
the stereo in Truman’s car and the one behind his bathroom mirror).
Such
self-conscious mise en scene begs the question of what kind of spectacle the
film audience is watching. Is this meant to be a typical episode of the
television show? We know it cannot be, for there are considerable time lapses
and the editing is much too precise and content-sensitive to mimic a live
programme: while a television director could to some extent time his cuts in
the presence of a fixed script, the spontaneous acting of Truman makes it
impossible to plan in advance the editing (especially of conversations) as
neatly as that.
Another
possibility is that the film is meant to be read as the narration of Truman’s
story by a film director using the material provided by the television show.
This would explain why, when Truman is sitting on the beach and starts
remembering about his father’s death at sea, the flashback is narrated by the
usual array of hidden cameras - still recognisable for the peculiar angles and
the way the shots are framed. We may therefore conclude that the filmmaker, in
order to preserve the fiction that the Truman show is an actual television
show, is suggesting that this material was drawn from the archives of the
series, and that it was used to retell the story according to the conventions
of a feature film rather than a television documentary.
Yet another
possibility is that what we are watching is a condensed show assembled by the
producers from the most significant material recorded during the previous few
days. Such a show would be closer to a feature film than to live reality TV
both in editing and in the narrative liberties taken by the authors - as it is
in fact the case. Truman’s flashback on the death of his father, for instance,
is the result of pure speculation, for the surveillance technology adopted in the
film does not go as far as mind reading. This last interpretation is not made
explicit in the film, but it is supported by a key piece of internal evidence:
after the cut to a bar in which two waitresses are discussing the show, the
(film) camera shows the television screen as a second flashback comes on, this
time narrating the story of Truman’s first meeting with Lauren/Sylvia. Hence we
can conclude that the assemblage is part of the actual show.
With the
exception of the occasional scenes of television viewing, then, the first hour
of the film is meant to portray the show in an unmediated fashion. This puts
the film audience in a very ambiguous position, for we are asked to identify
with the extreme voyeurism of the show’s fans, at the same time as the system
of values that we brought into the movie theatre moves us (presumably) to
dismiss this as a monstrous experiment. All the while, we are watching Truman
through the cameras which capture his every movement, and listen to him through
dozens of hidden microphones. We are meant to sympathise with his status of
prisoner, and yet we partake in his constant surveillance. Thus his first,
futile attempt to escape the panspectrum with Lauren resembles the chases of
Robert Dean by the NSA in Enemy of the State, for in both cases
the audience assumes the point of view of the pursuer, not the one of the
pursued. In terms of narrative perspective, we are effectively siding with the
prison guards.
Espionage
is an important element of the film. Prominent characters such as Truman’s wife
Meryl, his mother and his best friend Marlon are akin to spies who have
forfeited their private lives in order to pursue their career. But the spy film
genre is also directly taken as a referent, notably in the sequence in which Truman
unwittingly tunes his radio on the frequency used by the people who track his
movements around town. “He’s turning left on Lancaster square” the radio
announces as he drives the car to work, and “Oh, no, he’s almost hit a lady!”
when he swerves to avoid a passer-by in his amazement at what he is hearing.
Made suddenly paranoid (and not without reason) he then decides to abandon his
routine and to wander around the square, as if trying to catch glimpses of his
followers, in a scene strongly reminiscent of the famous one in The Conversation. Here too the problem
is one of surveillance: how to record pictures and sounds of a person walking
around a crowded square along a non-predetermined trajectory. The solutions,
albeit made easier by technological advances, are indeed worthy of the
resourcefulness of Harry Caul, and include the rear-view mirror of a parked car
which changes angle in real time in order to enable a camera to follow Truman’s
movements from its concealed position.
The
panspectrum that is Seahaven Island works because it is small enough in
relation to the resources of the show’s producers. In this sense we can see
that there are two reasons why they will not allow Truman to leave the studio
and go into the real world: one, perhaps the most obvious, is that the real
world is the place where Truman’s life is a television show - and the moment
Truman saw that show, or were approached by one of his fans, the foundations of
the project would fall apart. But, just as importantly, in the real world it
would also be impossible to follow Truman closely enough for the show to be
technically feasible. Even if it were possible to confine Truman to his
country, not even the NSA has disseminated enough instruments of surveillance
to achieve the total annihilation of someone’s privacy on such a vast scale.
In the
absence of reasons of national security, this particular act of surveillance
must be financed independently of the huge resources of state agencies. In
other words, the espionage war against one that is the Truman Show requires the
panspectrum to be financially viable, and in fact it literally pays for itself
by shoving a variety of consumer products in front of the orifices of its
surveillance apparatus.
Truman’s
world, then, differs from ours in that it needs constant funding in order to
exist. High ratings are necessary for the show to remain on air and for the
simulation around him not to fall apart. And yet the show’s storyline appears
deliberately dull. Aside from the staging of his father’s death, in itself a
device to generate a fear of water in Truman and ensure that he will never
leave the island, his life has been manufactured to be as boring and uneventful
as possible. And when the father is reintroduced, in a typical soap opera
twist, it is not to boost the ratings but to remedy a previous attempt of the
actor playing the part to contact his “son”.
Once again,
the reason for this perpetual dullness is partly practical: if Truman’s freedom
of choice had not been systematically restrained, it would be much harder to
ensure his permanence on the island; moreover, the predictable routine
guaranteed by a stable, middle-class marriage and an office job makes
round-the-clock surveillance a much easier task. But the implications work on
several levels. On one hand, the great popularity of the show notwithstanding
its lack of a captivating story encourages us even more to picture the
television audience as a collective monster which takes pleasure solely in the
elaborate torture that Truman is subjected to. It is not his successes or
failures that the viewers of the show respond to, for he has been deprived of
both - and in the absence of a real plot all that is left if the interest in
the experiment itself, with Truman as the guinea pig. But on another level,
this situation contributes to shatter the illusion that surveillance can be
carried out in a detached and objective manner, without affecting the subject
as long as he or she is unaware of what is happening. The whole show becomes a
demonstration of the panoptic principle at work: in order for us to be able to
observe Truman we have first of all to turn him into a model prisoner, one who
has interiorised the moral code required by the extreme example of disciplinary
society that he inhabits.
The
contradictions which underlie this experiment are akin to those of many
contemporary television shows which aim to portray the everyday life of
ordinary people in a more or less unmediated fashion. Of particular interest
for the discussion of this film, since they seem to have been partly inspired
by The Truman Show, are those which
have recently been produced in several countries under the title of Big Brother. In these particular example
of reality TV, based on an original concept launched in 1999 by Dutch producer
John de Mol[7], a group of
people is made to reside for a set number of weeks in a purpose-built house
disseminated with hidden microphones and cameras. Every week one of the
participants is evicted after a secret ballot within the group, until the last
remaining participant is left to collect the cash prize at the end of the
series.
Despite the
lack of a script and of professional actors may support the claim that these
shows achieve a more truthful level of representation than mere fiction, the
final product could not be farther from any meaningful definition of the real.
The mini-worlds where the participants are made to live - enclosed television
studios which are smaller scale equivalents of Truman’s Seahaven Island - have
never been anything like real places inhabited by real people. They are wholly
permeated and defined by the presence of cameras, literally built on the
principle of surveillance. And, in a sense, so are the participants. For the
duration of the show their ‘real’ lives are put on hold as they forfeit jobs,
families and friends to play an elaborate game of survival; a game whose rules
require them to change their behaviour in order to always place themselves on
the winning side and escape exile from the artificial world for as long as
possible. Under these conditions, it seems difficult to argue that there is
anything real going on inside these fake homes. What is being portrayed is not
life as seen through television, but life inside
television.
The fact
that Truman is unaware of the deal does not add a dimension of reality to his
show; it merely makes the unreality of it even more unbearable. There is a
sense in which The Truman Show is a
horror film, and a rather gory one at that. Far from providing an innocent
window on a man’s life, the cameras and microphones that enable us to keep
constant track of Truman’s actions are brutal instruments of violation. In this
film, to watch means quite literally to harm, and television viewing becomes an
act of mass violence; for Truman’s captivity is at once a consequence of the
constraints imposed by surveillance technology, and a commercial transaction in
which the viewers prolong the torture by purchasing the products advertised in
the show. The levity of the film’s style does little to tone down the abject
victimisation of its protagonist.
One is
reminded again of Nineteen Eighty-Four,
except here the conditioning is far more subtle. Truman needs not be reminded
that Big Brother is watching him - in fact the mortification of his will works
much better if he has no idea that he is being watched at all. For how can the
individual rebel against a system which does not exist? The fabrication of
news, the distortion of the world beyond the borders are at work here like in
Oceania, for instance when a colleague of Truman triumphantly shows him the
headline of a newspaper boasting that Seahaven is the “Best place on earth!”, while the advertising posters in a
travel agency peculiarly suggest that visiting other countries is dangerous as well
as futile. Furthermore, like in Nineteen
Eighty-Four the rulers of this little world do not stop at prohibiting
certain behaviours, but strive to engineer society in order to blank them out
altogether.
Ultimately,
of course, the simulation falls apart, and the free spirit of the white male
hero triumphs. Yet we have to question whether the satire of the entertainment
machine achieved by conflating spectacle and surveillance would have been more
effective if the ending had been different. A much more biting - and perhaps,
in a Nineteen Eighty-Four-like
fashion, quite unbearable - finale, would have had Truman resign himself to
live in his fake world and carry on with his fake life, despite knowing at
heart that all time he is being watched, and looked after, by his captors. In
fact all that his liberation achieves is to suddenly exculpate the television
viewers, whom we see celebrate the end of the show as if they had been opposed
to its experiment all along. Thus the ending restores a reassuring status
quo ante in which events like the Truman Show are a one-off exception, not
the disturbing norm, and society outside of Seahaven Island can carry on as
usual.
While on
the one hand it exculpates the television audience and lays the blame for the
excesses of the experiment on a faceless corporate network and on a handful of
producers - as if they alone were morally responsible for the success of the
show among its viewers - the film is even more unduly magnanimous with its own
audience. While television is demonised as the source of demeaning reality
shows which violate the most basic of human rights, cinema is implicitly set up
as a medium capable of a more in-depth analysis of the issues and of
encouraging debate. All this despite the singular conflation of filmmaking and
surveillance realised during the first half of the film, and the points made
repeatedly with regard to the role of simulation in securing a disciplined
society. If Christof is right when he states that “we accept the truth of the
world we live in”, then it would be possible to suggest that cinema plays an
important role in constructing this truth via its very appealing simulations,
and a case could be made for its direct involvement in the panoptic society.
The Matrix and the ultimate simulation
Whether or
not we should accept the truth of the world we live in, and choose to trust our
perceptions, is an issue that recurs throughout the history of philosophy.
Descartes gave it a famous formulation when he hypothesised that the world as we
know it may be the product of a malignant god, a demon playing with our senses[8].
This notion could be used to justify to the most paranoid of assumptions, for
if we cannot even be sure of the existence of the physical world that surrounds
us, if all experiences and memories of a lifetime may have been manufactured by
a superior entity, then not only the existence of individuals like Truman, but
indeed of the whole of humanity could very well be questioned.
This is the
premise of The Matrix (USA, 1999,
Andy and Larry Wachowski) - the world as we know is in fact a carefully
constructed illusion. The year is around 2199 and machines have taken over the
world, using people as a source of bioeletrical power while their brains are
suspended in the virtual reality called the Matrix, a simulation which looks
and feels like a the year 1999 as it is recorded in the collective memory of
its human inhabitants
There are,
predictably, a handful of rebels, who lead dreary, clandestine lives in the
world dominated by machines. They have learnt to travel into the Matrix and
even bend its laws to a certain degree in order to transcend their physical
limitations and achieve superhuman strength and speed. But being immune from
the illusion does not make their lives easier. If anything, just the opposite,
for they are in constant danger of being found out and destroyed both in the
machinic world, where robot scanners seek out the humans who are not plugged
into the system, and inside the Matrix, which is scoured by a handful of
extremely powerful and relentless agents,
trained to recognise and kill the enlightened few. These agents, whose name
recalls the software applications which scour the Internet in search of
information, represent the embodiment of electronic surveillance and of the
Superpanopticon; seemingly ubiquitous and capable of travelling within the
confines of the simulated world at the speed of light (much like packets of
information circulating through a computer network), they exercise constant and
relentless surveillance inside the Matrix.
In this
rather bleak scenario the rebels can find some solace in the prophecy that some
day they will find The One, an individual capable of penetrating the secrets of
the Matrix and of beating the agents, and the machines that have created them,
at their own game. He will lead humanity out of captivity and shatter the
illusion, so that the real world can be reclaimed and turned again into a place
fit for human life.
As in The Truman Show, here too a
quintessentially paranoid vision is made possible by communications technology
and by its capacity to fool the senses and mimic the real. The key difference
is that in The Truman Show humans
were still in control of technology, even as they employed it in manipulative
and distorting ways; in The Matrix,
on the other hand, the real enemy is AI, Artificial Intelligence, perpetuating
the science fiction cliché that as soon as machines are endowed with human-like
brains they will use them to turn against their creators. The cliché is taken a
step further here since the machines, instead of merely setting out to wipe
humans off the face of the planet (like in, say, The Terminator), figure out a way of turning them into a convenient
source of renewable power.
From this
premise, the film sets out to narrate the journey towards self-consciousness of
a male hero, a rather geeky computer programmer by day/hacker by night known on
either side of his double life as Thomas Anderson and Neo. At first a common,
unaware inhabitant of the Matrix (but with the nagging feeling that the world
may not be as it seems), Anderson/Neo is recruited by the rebels and made to
see the reality of the world around him, or rather the unreality of what he has
always accepted as the real. Much like Truman’s solitary journey on a boat
outside of Seahaven and into the world, the trials faced by Neo throughout the
rest of the film have more to do with the realisation of his full potential
(and the shedding of the old identity of Mr Anderson, cog in the machine) than
with the danger of being destroyed along the way. They are mystical trials on
the path of spiritual enlightenment.
Or at least
this is what the authors would like us to think. In spite of the temptation one
may feel to dismiss the storyline as a mere vehicle for a series of extremely
well constructed action scenes, the Wachowski brothers worked three years on
the script for The Matrix, and they
appear serious when they talk of the film’s deeper significance. They speak
openly of references to Greek myths, the Bible and the path towards the
re-incarnation of the Buddha[9].
In the words of Larry Wachowski, “mythology, theology and higher-level
mathematics [...] are all ways human beings try to answer bigger questions, as
well as The Big Question. If you're going to do epic stories, you should
concern yourself with those issues. People might not understand all the
allusions in the movie, but they understand the important ideas. We wanted to
make people think, engage their minds a bit.”[10]
Such claims authorise us to explore these ‘important ideas’ and the way they
are constructed in the film.
The theme
of the quest of spiritual self-discovery, and of the liberation from the
tyranny of machines, appears to be the central point. Immediately it transpires
that in this respect things are not as clear-cut as they seem, for the
mechanisation suffered by humans as a consequence of their defeat has some
positive repercussions along with the more obvious, horrifying ones: thus, no
sooner has Neo been unplugged from the tubes that enabled the machines to feed
off him, that he is plugged into another one in order to get a full training in
the martial arts by having the appropriate software uploaded into his brain.
Such
juxtapositions illustrate how technology operates both as a friendly tool and
as the enemy in this film. The irony
is all the more obvious if we pause to consider that it is cutting-edge digital
technology that makes the film what it is, and that the production crew must
have included a significant numbers of computer and special effects
enthusiasts. Line producer Paul Taglianetti’s boast that there are as many as
480 effect shots in the film[11]
betrays the love of simulations of the very people who created this parable
against computer-mediated experience. Indeed, what appears as the Matrix in the
film, and that one would assume is the physical world in which the audience
lives, is in fact mostly simulated through a software called Virtual
Cinematography, which enabled the studio to “turn a live-action location or set
into a photo-realistic virtual set for generating any camera move”[12].
In other words, instead of setting digital effects on a real, photographed
background, the filmmakers produced digital backgrounds that looked realistic
and at the same time could be manipulated more easily than real ones.
The result
is a remarkable blurring of the boundaries: if after viewing The Truman Show we may be surprised to
discover that the film was shot on location in Seaside, Florida, a place that
looks so phoney as to pass admirably for a television studio, in The Matrix the metropolitan setting of
Sydney, Australia, is turned into a digital set which is in turn supposed to
pass as a real place which is in fact a simulation. But the audience is meant
to think that it is real, that it is their
reality, much like the audience of The
Truman Show was meant to think of Seahaven as a television studio. There is
a manipulation at work here that is not too dissimilar from the one perpetrated
on Truman and Neo, and it throws their journeys of self-discovery into an
ambiguous light. For the filmmakers are using the same illusions, the same
simulations which they portray as dehumanising.
The
contradictions in the anti-technological stance of The Matrix abound. Readers
of William Gibson, and indeed of every cyberpunk writer since, will immediately
identify the Matrix with cyberspace and the Internet; how can a film, then,
warn us against the dangers of shifting our lives onto the computer networks
and at the same time advertise massively through a website[13]?
How can Neo’s spiritual self benefit from learning the martial arts not through
painful and rigorous training but in a matter of seconds through a piece of
computer software? And why is it that, when it comes to rescuing Morpheus from
the headquarters of the enemy, Neo turns his back on the spiritual teachings of
his master and asks for “Guns. Lots of guns”?
The issue
seems to be one of control: technology is regarded positively as long as it can
be harnessed and it responds to straightforward commands. Guns are a prime
example: you press the trigger, they fire the shot. Simple enough. Other tools
prove to be less predictable, for they carry out more complex functions. The
cameras and microphones used by Harry Caul, for instance, are not just
instruments of surveillance; they could be used to shoot the film of a family
birthday, or monitor safety in a power plant. But one day they could be
developed to such an extent as to be able to map the movements of an individual
on a 24-hour basis, and broadcast them live around the world. At such a point
we could say that, in spite of the fact they are still being operated by
humans, these tools have escaped our control, because they have evolved towards
new, unpredicted tasks.
Accordingly,
the original sin in The Matrix is
that we have finally created Artificial Intelligence, and have thus lost all
control over our tools. Contextualised in the year the film was made, it is a
parable that reflects the widespread fear of being left behind by the advances
of information technology; a fear boosted by the unforeseeable, chaotic,
uncontrollable spread of the Internet. Even if the network has no intelligence
of its own, and each one of its cells is ultimately controlled by a human
being, the overall behaviour of the sum of the cells is largely outside the
control not only of individuals but also of governments and international
organisations. The Internet grows, much like an organism, and at a rate that
would have been unimaginable at the beginning of the 1990’s. That the reaction
to this phenomenon should be one of exhilaration mixed with disquiet is perhaps
not surprising. More singular is the way that films like The Matrix polarise the attraction for technology and the outright
fear of the same in such extreme tones, leading to an overall stance that seems
unhealthy as well as contradictory.
That there
are other ways to painting our technological future than the strictly utopian
or dystopian is proven by cyberpunk literature, a sub-genre of science-fiction
inaugurated by William Gibson in 1984 with Neuromancer.
As well as foreseeing the Internet with remarkable clarity, Neuromancer engages in the exploration
of a world characterised by the
overlapping of the human and the technological domains, where people can
enhance their abilities through cyber-implants and even achieve immortality by
uploading their memories and thought-processes onto the computer network, here
too known as the Matrix. The similarities with the film by the Wachowski
brothers are numerous, and include the pairing of male hacker and female
warrior, the mention of AIs and of a human city called Zion, the nature of the
Matrix as a “consensual hallucination”, the possibility of uploading computer
software into the human brain, the extensive role of martial arts in the story.
And yet in more significant ways The
Matrix and Neuromancer could not
be more different. Despite borrowing many of the themes, some of the jargon and
a lot of the mystique of cyberpunk literature, the film does not come even
close to replicating the richness of the cyberpunk viewpoint on the social
impact of the new technologies.
The
differences can be observed by looking at Johnny
Mnemonic (Canada/Usa, 1995, Robert Longo), a film which, regardless of its
actual merits, is much more deserving the cyberpunk label, and not merely due
to the fact of having been written by Gibson himself. Also starring Keanu
Reeves in the title role, Johnny Mnemonic
is set in a near-future dominated by corporates in which a data courier,
who is capable of uploading data into his brain and smuggle to its destination
without the danger of electronic interceptions, is caught in a mission that
goes horribly wrong. Overloaded with data from a pharmaceutical company, Johnny
finds himself haunted by both the mafia and the corporate police, who are
desperate to cut off his head in order to recover the information (which turns
out to be the cure for NAS, a future planetary plague). What is worse, he is
going to die in a matter of hours if he does not get rid of the data, and part
of the download code was conveniently destroyed in a skirmish with the mafia at
the beginning of the film.
Enter the
LoTek, a group of destitute rebels whose main activity is to hack into the
global television networks and pollute them with the kind of information that
those in power are trying to keep the lid on - the cure for NAS being of course
the prime example of such information. Eventually, with the help of a
super-intelligent cetacean hacker named Jones, the LoTeks manage to download
the cure and broadcast it to the world, saving Johnny’s life and that of
million of others in the process.
The key
difference in the dystopian premises of the two films is that the future of Johnny Mnemonic is explicitly portrayed as
a direct result not of technological advances, but of a strict free market
logic. With the corporates in charge and the disappearance of nation states and
elected governments, the gap between the rich and the poor has grown
exponentially. It is a jungle out there, and to make it into the higher classes
requires enormous sacrifices - Johnny in fact forfeits most of his long-term
memory (and therefore a significant part of his identity) in order to be able
to carry more data in his brain and increase his earning potential. In this
context, the Internet has been turned from the open, largely user-directed
network of today into the place where corporates vie for information, trying to
penetrate each other’s defences. This is why the LoTeks’ strategy to overthrow
the system mainly consists in attempts to achieve a more democratic sharing of
information via computer-piracy. Their actions are not aimed, like those of the
rebels of The Matrix, at restoring a
society of the past by rejecting the technology of the present one; rather,
they endeavour to found a new and fairer one, based on something akin to
Jean-François Lyotard’s motto – “give the public free access to the memory and
data banks”[14].
In this
perspective, Johnny’s triumph - unlike Neo’s - does not consist in saving the
world (the credit should rather go to the LoTeks and especially to the
dolphin), but in achieving a higher level of social and political awareness.
Thus, before joining the rebels as a last resort to avoid death by data
overload, he breaks into a speech that exorcises the set of values he has to
get rid of in order to be saved:
You see that city over there? That’s where I’m supposed to be. Not here
with the dogs and the garbage and the fucking last month’s newspapers blowing
back and forth. I’ve had it with them, I’ve had with you, I’ve had with all
this... I WANT ROOM SERVICE! I want a club sandwich, I want a cold Mexican
beer, I want a ten-thousand-dollar-a-night hooker. I want my shirts laundered
like they do at the Imperial Hotel in Tokyo...
The mention
of clothing points to a recurring visual theme of the film. Johnny wears the
same expensive suit throughout - it starts off well-ironed and spotless,
perfectly worn by cover-boy Reeves, and it gradually gets splattered and torn
until in the final scenes it ends up resembling the casual, no-frills, utility
clothing worn by the LoTeks. In other words, the downgrading of Johnny’s
clothing mirrors his conversion to a different, less money-driven way of life.
The rebels
in The Matrix, on the other hand,
never stop loving fancy clothes. In their real lives, they are restricted to
the same kind of clothing worn by the LoTeks - grey, loose, ill-fitting
uniforms. But as soon as they enter the Matrix, where they can pick from an
endless wardrobe of simulated garments, they go for the super-expensive look:
long leather trench-coats, cutting edge magazine-like fashion statements. It is
a love of clothes that sometimes defies logic, for even as they prepare to
break into a military complex they choose to go for leather outfits with
tail-coats that trail to the floor - perhaps not the kind of comfortable
garments that the situation would have called for.
The ensuing
massacre is in fact chillingly glamorised, to the point of attracting some
criticism in the debate on cinema’s portrayal of the use of firearms[15].
It can hardly be disputed that the scene offers an example not of violence as a
last resort, but of cool, utterly enjoyable violence; and that, even in the
context of the film’s story, it appears to rest on very thin moral
justifications. Briefly: Morpheus had previously told Neo that the inhabitants
of the Matrix, i.e. the humans plugged into the machines, have to be regarded
as enemies, for they will do anything to protect the illusion of the world they
live in. In spite of this, they are not beyond hope of salvation, and Neo is
living proof of this; they too could eventually be converted to the truth. As
he sets out on his mission to save Morpheus, Neo could choose to listen to his
master’s teachings, and rest on the knowledge that he can bend the rules of the
simulation to an extent that not even the machines are capable of. In other
words, if he truly believed in himself he could be invincible, and carry out
the mission without the need to hurt anyone. Instead, he opts to go in with
‘lots of guns’, and mows down dozens of fellow prisoners of the Matrix without
a hint of remorse, almost as if they too were part of the software construct,
like enemies in a videogame.
This is not
conclusive evidence that The Matrix carries
a reactionary message, but one has to question the individualistic,
ultra-violent ethos of this film, in which the world is saved once again by a
white male with perfect features, and machines are rejected as threats to the
purity of the human race even as the filmmakers embark on a technological orgy
in order to narrate their story. By choosing not to address this glaring
contradiction, The Matrix can do
little else than glide on the surface of the many issues its storyline touches
upon.
Conclusion
If cinema
has a role in the society of surveillance is precisely that of creating
powerful, well-crafted illusions which play with collective fears instead of
probing their deeper roots; films that reinforce the dominant ideology by giving
a false sense of resolution, as in the finales of both the Truman Show and The
Matrix, whereas in fact all that they are suggesting is that things should
go back to how they were in a mythical time in the past, before technology
started changing our lives.
In their
essay on technophobia in science fiction cinema, Michael Ryan and Douglas
Kellner propose that most anti-technological stances are inherently
conservative. “[T]echnology”, they argue, “is usually a crucial ideological
figure. [It] represents everything that threatens the grounding of conservative
social authority and everything that ideology is designed to neutralize. It
should not be surprising, then, that this era should witness the development of
a strain of films that portray technology negatively, usually from a
conservative perspective.”[16]
While this analysis is perhaps a little too clear-cut, for claiming that
technology is in itself an engine of positive social change is as questionable
as claiming the opposite, the authors suggest how we could account for the
contradictions incurred by films like the ones we have just analysed :
The increasingly technical sophistication of the economic world and the
shift away from industrialized manufacturing to tertiary sector ‘information
age’ production creates a hypermdernization that is at odds with the
traditionalist impulse in conservatism, the desire that old forms and
institutions be preserved. Yet the new technologies make possible alternative
institutions and lifestyles, as well as the reconstruction of the social world.
Perhaps this accounts for the desire for a more literal, natural world in
conservative films. It is a reaction to the world they themselves help create
through an ideal of efficient economic development.[17]
Both The Truman Show and The Matrix end up conveying an odd sort of nostalgia for the
present which betrays the effects of the antinomy described above, and which
prevents them from exploring future avenues of change. Not having come to terms
with the full impact of communications technology on society and, crucially, on
their own structures of discourse, these science-fiction spectacles cannot
speak meaningfully about the future nor about the present; instead, they are
confined to dwell on paranoid visions - such as those of oppressive Panopticons
- which expose their contradictory stance towards the very technology which
enables them to exist.
Acknowledgments
My thanks
go to Dr. Russell Campbell of Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand,
under whose supervision I wrote this research paper in 2000.
Filmography
Brazil (UK, 1985). Director: Terry Gilliam. Screenplay: Terry Gilliam, Charles
McKeown, Tom Stoppard.
The Conversation (USA, 1972). Director: Francis Ford
Coppola. Screenplay: Francis Ford Coppola
Enemy of the State (USA, 1998). Director. Tony Scott.
Screenplay: David Marconi.
Johnny Mnemonic (Canada/Usa, 1995. Director: Robert
Longo. Screenplay: William Gibson.
The Matrix (USA, 1999). Directors: Andy and
Larry Wachowski. Screenplay: Andy and Larry Wachowski.
Nineteen Eighty-Four (UK, 1984). Director: Michael
Radford. Screenplay: Jonathan Gems, Michael Radford.
The Truman Show (USA, 1998). Director: Peter Weir. Screenplay:
Andrew Niccol
Bibliography
De Landa, Manuel. War in the Age of Intelligent Machines. New York: Swerve Editions,
1991.
Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish - The Birth of the Prison. London: Penguin
Books, 1997.
Hager, Nicky. Secret Power - New Zealand’s Role in the International Spy Network.
Nelson: Craig Potton Publishing, 1996.
Kemp Smith, Norman (ed.). Descartes’ Philosophical Writings. London: Macmillan & Co.,
1952.
Leo, John. ‘Gunning for Hollywood’. In U.S. News & World Report (May 10,
1999, v126 i18), p.16.
Lyotard, Jean-François. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1984.
Orwell, George. Nineteen Eighty-Four. London: Charnwood, 1982.
Poster, Mark. The Mode of Information. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990.
Ressner, Jeffrey. ‘Popular Metaphysics: In The
Matrix, the Wachowskis make a hit film out of the Bible, cyberpunk and higher
math’. In Time (April 19, 1999, v153
i15) p. 75.
Robertson, Barbara. ‘Living Virtual Existence’.
In Computer Graphics World (May 1999,
v22 i5), p. 54.
Ryan, Michael and Douglas Kellner. ‘Technophobia’.
In Annette Kuhn (ed.) Alien Zone -
Cultural Theory and Contemporary Science Fiction Cinema. London and New
York: Verso, 1990.
Swarsdon, Anne. ‘They're Watching 'Big Brother'
- Dutch TV Hit Documents Real Life of Captive Household’. In The Washington Post (September 25,
1999), p. A01.
[1]The largest scale electronic
surveillance project known to the public is probably Echelon, a communications
intelligence system operating among the UKUSA countries and uncovered by New
Zealand journalist Nicky Hager in 1996. “Under the Echelon system,” writes
Hager, “a particular station’s Dictionary computer contains not only its parent
agency’s chosen keywords, but also a list for each of the other four agencies
[...]. So each station collects the telephone calls, faxes, telefaxes, Internet
messages and other electronic communications that its computers have been
pre-programmed to select for all the allies and automatically sends this
intelligence to them.”
Nicky
Hager, Secret Power - New Zealand’s Role
in the International Spy Network (Nelson: Craig Potton Publishing, 1996),
p. 29.
[2] Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish - The Birth of the
Prison (London: Penguin Books, 1997),
p. 201.
[3] This mechanism is explicitly laid
out at the beginning of the novel: “The telescreen received and transmitted
simultaneously. Any sound that Winston made, above the level of a very low
whisper, would be picked up by it; moreover, so long as he remained within the
field of vision which the metal plaque commanded, he could be seen as well as
heard. There was of course no way of knowing whether you were being watched at
any given moment. How often, or on what system, the Thought Police plugged in
on any individual wire was guesswork. It was even conceivable that they watched
everybody all the time. But at any rate they could plug in your wire whenever
they wanted to. You had to live - did live, from habit that became instinct -
on the assumption that every sound you made was overheard, and, except in
darkness, every movement scrutinized.”
George
Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four,
(London: Charnwood, 1982), p. 5.
[4] This mechanism is applied by Manuel
De Landa to the self-justification of intelligence agencies: “Almost without
exception secret service organizations have thrived in times of turbulence and,
conversely, have seen their power vanish as turmoil slows. For this reason they
survive by inciting social turbulence, spreading rumors and inventing imaginary
enemies, fifth columns, and bomber and missile gaps. They need to keep society
in constant alert, in a generalized state of fear and paranoia, in order to
sustain themselves. This has led to the development of a gigantic “espionage
industry,” whose entire existence is based on a bluff few governments dare to
call.”
Manuel
De Landa, War in the Age of Intelligent
Machines (New York: Swerve Editions, 1991), p. 190.
[5] Mark Poster, The Mode of Information (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), p. 93
[6] Cf. Manuel De Landa, Ibid., p. 206.
[7] For a comprehensive media report on
the original show, see Anne Swarsdon, ‘They're Watching 'Big Brother' - Dutch
TV Hit Documents Real Life of Captive Household’, in The Washington Post (September 25, 1999), p. A01.
[8] Cf. Norman Kemp Smith (ed.), Descartes’ Philosophical Writings
(London: Macmillan & Co., 1952), pp. 200-201.
[9] Cf. The interview with Larry
Wachowski in Jeffrey Ressner, ‘Popular Metaphysics: In The Matrix, the
Wachowskis make a hit film out of the Bible, cyberpunk and higher math’, in Time (April 19, 1999, v153 i15) p. 75.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Quoted in Barbara Robertson,
‘Living Virtual Existence’, Computer
Graphics World (May 1999, v22 i5), p. 54.
[12] Ibid.
[13] www.whatisthematrix.com
[14] Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on
Knowledge (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), p. 67.
[15] Cf. John Leo, ‘Gunning for
Hollywood’, in U.S. News & World
Report (May 10, 1999, v126 i18), p.16.
[16] Michael Ryan and Douglas Kellner,
‘Technophobia’, in Annette Kuhn (ed.), Alien
Zone - Cultural Theory and Contemporary Science Fiction Cinema (London and
New York: Verso, 1990), pp. 58-59.
[17]Ibid., p. 65.